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Killing to Avoid Arrest Aggravator
By JAMrEs HIGGINS*
ON JULY 23, 1986, Rhonda Crane was traveling alone on Highway
29 in Perry County, Mississippi to meet her parents for a camping
trip.' In broad daylight, Paul Woodward, who was driving a logging
truck, forced Crane's vehicle to stop.2 He ordered her into his truck at
gunpoint and drove her to a secluded spot four and a half miles
away.3 Woodward, still holding the gun, took her approximately fifty
to one hundred yards into the woods and raped her.4 When Crane
bent over to collect her belongings, Woodward shot her in the back of
the head, killing her instantly.5 Woodward then went back to his truck
and continued to haul wood for the rest of the day.6
When initially questioned by law enforcement, Woodward
claimed he saw nothing unusual near the scene of the kidnapping. 7
* Class of 2005. Thanks to Professor Josh Davis, Professor Steve Shatz, and the
Office of Capital Defense Counsel, Jackson, Mississippi.
This Comment is the second in an occasional series of comments written by law
students who have participated in the University of San Francisco School of Law's Keta
Taylor Colby Death Penalty Project ("KTC Project"). The KTC Project funds, trains, and
sends law students to spend a summer working with capital defense lawyers in the South.
See Steven F. Shatz, The Keta Taylor Colby Death Penalty Project: Prologue, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 747
(2004). This Comment arises from the author's work as a KTC intern in Mississippi during
the summer of 2003.
1. Woodward v. State, 726 So. 2d 524, 526 (Miss. 1997).




6. Id. at 539.
7. Id.
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The next day, Woodward again reported to work.8 Ms. Crane's father,
searching the woods for his missing daughter, found her body where
Woodward had left her.9
Woodward was soon arrested, indicted, and tried for capital mur-
der (with the underlying crime of rape), kidnapping, and sexual bat-
tery. 10 In April 1987, Woodward was convicted on all three counts and
sentenced to death.'1 The jury found the following aggravating cir-
cumstances 12 to exist: the murder was committed while Woodward was
engaged in the commission of rape, the murder was especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel, and the murder was committed for the pur-
pose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or effecting an escape
from custody. 13
Woodward argued on appeal that there was no evidence to sup-
port the proposition that the murder was committed for the purpose
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.14 The court disagreed, find-
ing sufficient evidence of this aggravator for several reasons. First, an
officer stopped Woodward a few hours after the murder and he did
not confess at that time. Additionally, after killing Crane, he com-
pleted his work for the day-presumably to avoid suspicion.1 5 Wood-
ward also allowed his truck to be searched, but did not mention that
he had committed the crime. 16 Finally, he threw the murder weapon
into a creek.17 The court concluded that "[a]ll of these facts could
reasonably indicate that Woodward did not want to be arrested for his
crimes."18
True, these facts indicate that Woodward attempted to avoid ap-
prehension for his crime. It is common sense that once a criminal
commits the act, he hopes not to get caught. The facts in this case,
however, do little to prove that Woodward's purpose in killing Crane
8. Id.
9. Id. at 526, 539.
10. Id. at 526.
11. Id. Woodward was re-sentenced in September 1995 because the Mississippi Su-
preme Court found that the first jury received an incorrect instruction regarding the ag-
gravating circumstances. Id. at 527. The second jury also rendered a verdict that Woodward
be sentenced to death. Id.
12. Aggravating circumstances will be referred to as "aggravators" or "aggravating
factors."
13. Id. at 526-27.
14. Id. at 540.
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was to avoid arrest, which is what the aggravator, on its face, seems to
require. Indeed, even if Woodward's actions effectively eliminated
Crane as a witness who could later assist in his apprehension, all
murders eliminate a key witness-the victim. Woodward v. State19 is just
one example of the many Mississippi cases that demonstrate the un-
constitutionality of the "killing to avoid arrest" aggravator. 20
Aggravators in general were created by states to limit the arbitrari-
ness of death sentences. 2 1 The United States Supreme Court has held
that aggravators cannot be vague or overbroad.22 The Fifth Circuit,
which includes Mississippi, has also held that aggravators cannot be
duplicative. 23 The issue is whether Mississippi's killing to avoid arrest
aggravator violates any of these principles. This Comment concludes
that in fact the aggravator offends both of these principles and should
therefore be eliminated.
Part I of this Comment looks at the constitutional law surround-
ing the death penalty, specifically the role of aggravating circum-
stances in narrowing the class of defendants who are death penalty
eligible. This section also lays out the framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of an aggravator. Part II first addresses the statutory
language of the aggravator and argues that it is both facially vague and
overbroad. Next, this Comment reviews Mississippi case law to demon-
strate the aggravator's constitutional deficiencies, including its over-
lapping with other statutory aggravators. After detailing other state
approaches to this aggravator in Part III, Part IV challenges the Missis-
sippi court's own construction of the aggravator. Because the con-
struction fails to remedy the statute's arbitrary and overbroad
application to defendants, the aggravator should be eliminated.
19. 726 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1997).
20. The statutory language of the aggravator will be abbreviated as "killing to avoid
arrest." Some Mississippi courts have referred to the aggravator as simply "avoiding arrest."
See, e.g., Foster v. State, 687 So. 2d 1124, 1139 (Miss. 1996); Walker v. State, 671 So. 2d 581,
611 (Miss. 1995). This abbreviation is a misnomer because it leads one to believe that a
defendant only has to avoid arrest to qualify for the aggravator. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
21. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89, 195-97 (1976) (noting that the State
of Georgia responded to this concern over arbitrariness by creating ten statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances).
22. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-77 & n.15 (1983) (interpreting the various
opinions of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
23. See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 250-51 (5th Cir. 1998).
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I. The United States Supreme Court's Requirements for
Aggravators and Mississippi's Response
To understand a constitutional challenge to an aggravator, one
must understand what the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit re-
quire for state death penalty schemes and how aggravators are re-
viewed. This section examines the death penalty scheme adopted by
Mississippi in response to these established principles.
A. The Supreme Court's Concern with Arbitrary Sentencing
One of the constitutional defects of the death penalty identified
by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia,24 the starting point in
modern death penalty jurisprudence, was that the judge or jury was
allowed too much sentencing discretion in determining whether de-
fendants would live or die.25 Subsequent courts have interpreted
Furman to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty under sentenc-
ing procedures that "create a substantial risk that the punishment will
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. '26 Rather, Furman
requires a state's sentencing scheme to provide a meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty should be im-
posed from the many cases in which it should not.27 This can be
achieved only by narrowing the class of criminal defendants eligible
for the death penalty.
B. Aggravators Must Limit Arbitrariness Without Being Vague
or Overbroad
In response to Furman, at least thirty-five state legislatures
amended their death penalty statutes. 28 In Gregg v. Georgia,29 a plural-
ity of the Supreme Court approved Georgia's new capital sentencing
procedure in part because of the requirement that the jury find at
least one valid statutory aggravating circumstance. 30 The Court be-
lieved that the aggravating circumstances requirement, in addition to
other protections, "adequately protected against the wanton and
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
25. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 875-77 & n.15 (interpreting Furman's holding in light of
Gregg).
26. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (explaining the central holding
of Furman as interpreted in subsequent cases).
27. Id. at 427-28 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)).
28. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 & n.23 (1976).
29. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
30. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-77 (1983) (describing the Court's holding
and reasoning in Gregg).
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freakish imposition of the death penalty."' This conclusion rested on
the premise that "each statutory aggravating circumstance must satisfy
a constitutional standard derived from the principles of Furman."32 To
meet this standard, the aggravator cannot be so vague or overbroad
that it fails to channel the decision patterns of juries, resulting in a
pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing similar to that declared
unconstitutional in Furman."
Since Gregg, the Court has reviewed claims that certain statutory
aggravating circumstances are vague and overbroad.3 4 An aggravator
is vague if it possesses no "common-sense core of meaning ... that
criminal juries should be capable of understanding," and, thus, would
likely cause juries to reach arbitrary or capricious decisions. 35 An ag-
gravator is overbroad if it fails to "genuinely narrow the class" of those
eligible for the death penalty36 and may conceivably apply to virtually
every defendant convicted of murder.37 In practice, the Court has re-
viewed vagueness and overbreadth challenges together because the
concepts are interrelated. An aggravator may be applied too broadly,
in part, because it is vague. Conversely, vague aggravators may be over-
broad because of their inconsistent application; they do not reasona-
bly justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of similar crimes. 38
Vagueness challenges were made in Godfrey v. Georgia39 and May-
nard v. Cartwright.40 In Godfrey, the issue was whether the aggravating
circumstance that the murder was "'outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman"' was overbroad and vague in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.41 In reach-
ing its conclusion that the aggravator was unconstitutionally vague,
the Court noted that there was nothing in the language of the statute
that would prevent an arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
31. Id. at 876. The Court found automatic appellate review to be another protection.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 876-77.
34. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988).
35. SeeJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 278-79 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
36. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877.
37. Arave, 507 U.S. at 474 (labeling aggravating circumstances that could apply to
every defendant as "constitutionally infirm").
38. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877.
39. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
40. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
41. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422-23 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (7) (1978)).
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sentence. 42 "A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize
almost every murder as 'outrageously or Wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman.' ,,43 The concern was that the jury had no guidance on how
to consider this aggravator in deciding whether to impose capital pun-
ishment.44 Similarly, in Maynard, the Court considered whether
Oklahoma's aggravator that the murder was "'especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel"' was unconstitutionally vague. 45 The Court recognized
that the description "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" gave no
more guidance to the jury than did the aggravating circumstance in
Godfrey---and thus, the aggravator was unconstitutionally vague on its
face. 4
6
C. The Importance of Aggravators in Weighing States
As the Supreme Court recognized in Zant v. Stephens,47 the signifi-
cance of aggravating circumstances findings may depend on whether
a state is a "weighing" or "non-weighing" state. 48 In both weighing and
non-weighing states, the fact-finder must find true at least one statu-
tory aggravating circumstance in order for the defendant to be death-
eligible. 4 9 In a weighing state, at the conclusion of the penalty phase,
the sentencer, in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, must
determine whether all of the aggravating circumstances found out-
weigh the mitigating circumstances.5 0 By contrast, in a non-weighing
state, the sentencer is told only that it is to consider aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in making its penalty determination; the sen-
tencer is not, however, told to consider multiple aggravating circum-
stances to be any more significant than a single circumstance or to
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating
circumstances. 5 1
42. Id. at 428.
43. Id. at 428-29.
44. See id. at 429.
45. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359-60 (quoting the challenged Oklahoma aggravator).
46. See id. at 359-60, 363-64 (affirming the lower court's judgment that the ag-
gravator was unconstitutionally vague).
47. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
48. Id. at 873-74, 880 (holding that the absence of governing standards for the jury in
weighing the significance of aggravating circumstances did not render the Georgia capital
sentencing statute invalid).
49. See id. at 876 & n.14.
50. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2) (c) (1999).
51. Zant, 462 U.S. 873-74. The difference between weighing and non-weighing states
can also be demonstrated by comparing Mississippi's jury instruction to that of Georgia, a
non-weighing state. In Mississippi, juries are instructed that once they find one or more of
the aggravators to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, they "must next examine and weigh
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Mississippi is a weighing state.52 In Mississippi, the jury is in-
structed to deliberate on whether statutorily defined aggravating cir-
cumstances and mitigating circumstances exist, and importantly,
whether the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating cir-
cumstances. 53 In a weighing state, aggravators "lie at the very heart of
the jury's ultimate decision to impose a death sentence. '' 54 The Su-
preme Court noted that a vague aggravator used in a weighing state is
worse than in a non-weighing state, because it creates the possibility of
randomness and "the risk that the jury will treat the defendant as
more deserving of the death penalty than he might otherwise be by
relying upon the existence of an illusory circumstance. ' 55 Conversely,
in non-weighing states, aggravating circumstances do not "play any
role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion,
apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of
murder who are eligible for the death penalty."56 In a weighing state,
however, the presence of constitutionally infirm aggravators could tip
the scale in favor of death.
D. A Response to Furman and Its Progeny: Mississippi's Death
Penalty Scheme
Mississippi restructured its death penalty procedure after
Furman.57 To narrow the class of death penalty eligible defendants,
the state first distinguished between "capital murder" and "murder,"
sometimes referred to as "simple murder.158 Simple murder is punish-
any aggravating circumstances against any mitigating circumstances." MISS.JUDICIAL COLL.,
MISSISSIPPI MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 1.24(I) (2003) [hereinafter Mississippi
JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL]. If the jury determines that "sufficient aggravating circum-
stances exist and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggra-
vating circumstances" the jury should impose the death penalty. Id. § 1.24(111). This
instruction suggests that in order to overcome a sentence of death, the jury must find a
mitigating circumstance to counterbalance each aggravator. By contrast, in Georgia the
jury is instructed that once finding an aggravator it "would be authorized to recommend
... a sentence of death, but [it] would not be required to do so." II COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR
COURT JUDGES OF GA., GEORGIA SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL CASES
§ 2.04.50 (3d ed. 2003). The jury is told that "[i]t is not required, and it is not necessary,
that [it] find any extenuating or mitigating fact or circumstance in order.., to return a
verdict setting the penalty to be imposed at life imprisonment." Id.
52. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2) (c).
53. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2).
54. United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 251 (5th Cir. 1998).
55. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 235 (1992).
56. Zant, 462 U.S. at 874; see also Stringer, 503 U.S. at 229-30.
57. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 & n.23 (1976).
58. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (Supp. 2003). Capital murder, while still encom-
passing a wide spectrum of murders, is limited to the killing of a peace officer or fireman;
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able by life imprisonment. 59 Those convicted of capital murder are
sentenced to death, life imprisonment without parole, or life impris-
onment with eligibility for parole.
60
Mississippi bifurcates its capital trials.61 Once ajury returns a capi-
tal murder verdict in the guilt phase of the trial, usually the same
judge and jury will conduct a sentencing phase as soon as practica-
ble. 62 In this proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter
that the court deems relevant to sentencing and must include matters
relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
63
After the jury determines at least one aggravating circumstance
exists and the defendant is death penalty eligible, the jury then weighs
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether
the death penalty should be imposed. The Mississippi statute lists
eight aggravating circumstances, including one for when "[t] he capi-
tal offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody." 64 Some of the other
aggravators are objective, whereby the factual circumstances either ex-
ist or do not. An example of an objective aggravator is if the murder
was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment. 65 The
jury may also consider seven mitigating circumstances, which include
a defendant's lack of a prior record, whether the offense was commit-
ted while the defendant suffered from an extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance, and the defendant's age at the time of the crime.
66
Aggravating circumstances play a crucial role in the death penalty
scheme, for if no aggravator is found, the death penalty cannot be
imposed.67 Because the killing to avoid arrest aggravator is both
facially vague and overbroad, a prosecutor can introduce this ag-
murder that is perpetrated by a person under life imprisonment; murder perpetrated by
use of a bomb; murder where the perpetrator is offered or receives anything of value for
committing the murder; felony-murder (including rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rob-
bery, sexual battery, and other sex crimes); murder by one engaged in child abuse; murder
on educational property; and murder of an elected official. Id. § 97-3-19(2).
59. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (1999).
60. Id.
61. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (1999). The Mississippi Supreme Court also auto-
matically reviews all death sentences to further reduce the arbitrariness of death sentences.
See id. § 99-19-101(4).
62. Id. § 99-19-101(1).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 99-19-101 (5) (e). The jury instruction on this aggravator mirrors the statutory
language. See Mississippi JuRY INSTRUcrIONS-CRIMINAL, supra note 51, § 1:24(II)(e).
65. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (5) (a).
66. See id. § 99-19-101(6).
67. See id. § 99-19-101(3).
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gravator knowing that a jury will easily find it. Therefore, how the jury
and court interpret this aggravator and how appellate courts review
the evidence literally become a matter of life or death.
H. The Killing to Avoid Arrest Aggravator Fails to Cure the
Arbitrariness of Mississippi's Death Penalty Scheme
The first part of this section examines the statutory text of the
killing to avoid arrest aggravator. As written, the aggravator is so vague
that a jury could apply it to nearly all capital murders. Next, Missis-
sippi case law will be reviewed as evidence that Mississippi juries apply
the aggravator in an arbitrary and overbroad manner. The final sec-
tion argues that the aggravator impermissibly duplicates other
aggravators.
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth
1. The Statute Is Facially Vague and Thus Capable of an
Overbroad Application
The killing to avoid arrest aggravator is not written with sufficient
precision to prevent ajury from adopting an overly broad interpreta-
tion. The statute provides for an aggravating circumstance where
"[t] he capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody."68 This
language permits the interpretation that the aggravator applies in any
case where another crime has preceded the murder and the suspect
has tried to evade arrest. Because the overwhelming majority of those
that have committed a capital murder have also committed an under-
lying felony, a broad reading of the killing to avoid arrest aggravator
therefore permits it to apply to almost all capital murders. 69 That is,
68. Id. § 99-19-101 (5) (e). The focus of this Comment is on the first clause of the stat-
ute (avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest) and not the second clause (effecting an escape
from custody). The latter clause seems to apply where an inmate escapes from jail or
prison, and in the course of the escape, he kills a prison guard. This scenario seems rela-
tively clear and there has been no dispute as to its application in Mississippi case law.
69. See Study from the Office of Capital Defense Counsel, Jackson, MS ("OCDC"),
Death Sentences with County of Prosecution and Date of Sentence: October 5, 1976
through June 30, 2003 (Jan. 15, 2004) (unpublished data, on file with U.S.F. Law Review)
[hereinafter OCDC Study]. The OCDC data tracks all death sentences imposed in Missis-
sippi between October 5, 1976 and June 30, 2003. See id. Using this data, the author calcu-
lated that 142 of 191 death sentences imposed in Mississippi during this time period
involved an underlying felony. See id. See also discussion Part II.B infra exploring how the
killing to avoid arrest aggravator subsumes the felony-murder aggravator.
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any time there is a felony-murder 70 the murder itself will help the per-
petrator avoid arrest by eliminating a witness-the victim. Further-
more, most, if not all, murderers take measures after killing to avoid
detection, such as changing one's appearance or simply leaving the
crime scene. If this kind of commonplace evidence leads to a finding
of the aggravator, then the aggravator unconstitutionally fails to nar-
row the application of the death penalty in any meaningful way.
Because Mississippi already has a felony-murder aggravator 71 de-
signed to protect victims of felonies from being murdered, the Legis-
lature, in drafting the killing to avoid arrest statute, would seem to
have focused on a different kind of killing-something narrower than
felony-murder. 72 One interpretation would be that the aggravator
only applies when a defendant kills a witness to an underlying felony
who is not the victim of the underlying felony.73 Because the witness
could assist in the defendant's eventual arrest, the defendant must
have killed the witness to avoid arrest. Alternatively, perhaps the ag-
gravator would only apply when the defendant's arrest is imminent
and the defendant kills someone who is in the position to make a
lawful arrest.74 Under either of these constructions, the Mississippi
70. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-19(2) (e). The statute defines felony-murder as the killing
of a human being
[w]hen done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in
the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual
battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or
nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any attempt to commit
such felonies.
Id.
71. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d). The statute provides that the felony-murder
aggravator must be found when
[t]he capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after com-
mitting or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping,
aircraft piracy, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age
of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or feloni-
ous abuse and/or battery of a child .... or the unlawful use or detonation of a
bomb or explosive device.
Id.
72. The Mississippi Supreme Court has never referred to the statute's legislative his-
tory, nor is there a reference to this history in the annotated statute.
73. See State v. Loyd, 459 So. 2d 498, 504 (La. 1984).
74. See People v. Bigelow, 691 P.2d 994, 1007 (Cal. 1984) (holding that the special
circumstance of avoiding arrest should be limited to cases in which the arrest is imminent).
The court also noted that applying the aggravator in cases where the defendant may have
killed the victim to prevent him from reporting the underlying crime was an "unreasonably
expansive reading . . . which would cause that circumstance to overlap extensively with
felony murder." Id. at 1006. For further discussion on duplicate aggravators, see discussion
infra Part II.B.
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Legislature would be protecting a different class of victims. However,
the text of the statute is so awkwardly written that a jury could easily
apply the aggravator to a broader range of murders.
A facial challenge to an aggravator requires the court to analyze
the aggravator for "clarity, objectivity, and principled guidance." 75
The killing to avoid arrest aggravator, on its face, lacks this objectivity
because the jury must initially consider the defendant's "purpose" in
killing the victim. It is not simply that the defendant avoids or pre-
vents a lawful arrest; rather, his purpose in the killing must be to avoid
or prevent a lawful arrest. For example, if a defendant kidnaps and
murders his estranged wife's daughter for revenge, then the purpose
in killing the daughter is revenge, not to avoid arrest.76 The fact that
the defendant may subsequently avoid arrest because there are no
other witnesses does not seem to qualify him for this aggravator. 77
However, because it is difficult to know the defendant's exact purpose
in killing the victim, there must still be some objective factual evi-
dence for the jury to use in finding the aggravator. The challenge for
the jury is to rely on factual circumstances that do not apply to every
murder.
The terms "avoiding" and "preventing" also contribute to the stat-
ute's lack of clarity and guidance. "Preventing" is a proactive verb in
the sense that a defendant may literally prevent an arrest by shooting
at his would-be capturer. Conversely, the term "avoiding" could refer
to any post-killing expression, such as hiding the victim's body, which
allows the defendant to remain at-large. Minimal efforts that a crimi-
nal undertakes to avoid detection could serve as a basis for inferring
that the murder itself was an attempt to avoid arrest. By including
both "avoiding" and "preventing," the Mississippi Legislature appears
to have intended the aggravator to apply to a broad scope of actions.
Finally, it is questionable what the Mississippi Legislature in-
tended by requiring the defendant to be avoiding or preventing a
"lawful arrest" as opposed to simply an arrest. One argument is that
the statute protects those that effectuate lawful arrests, namely police
75. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 986 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that this standard is required in weighing states because in weighing states "a
vague aggravator creates the risk of an arbitrary thumb on death's side of the scale").
76. See Taylor v. State, 672 So. 2d 1246, 1253-54, 1275 (Miss. 1996).
77. See id. at 1275. Taylor is the only case where the Mississippi Supreme Court re-
versed the jury's finding of the killing to avoid arrest aggravator. See infra note 115 (provid-
ing the author's survey of Mississippi Supreme Court cases discussing the aggravator).
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officers. 78 The fact that the statute includes an "escape from custody"
element to protect prison guards enhances this argument. Mississippi,
however, has another aggravating circumstance that applies when the
capital offense was committed to "disrupt the enforcement of laws."' 79
This aggravator appears to be specifically directed at protecting those
that enforce laws. Reading the two aggravators together, killing to
avoid a "lawful arrest" can be read more broadly-it can apply to any
case where the killing of the victim allows the defendant to avoid ar-
rest for the underlying felony. When the aggravator is read this
broadly, it fails to meet the constitutional requirement of narrowing
the class of death-eligible defendants mandated by Furman and its
progeny.
2. Case Law Confirms that Mississippi Juries Find the Aggravator
Based on Evidence that Is Common to Virtually All
Felony-Murders
Mississippi juries find the killing to avoid arrest aggravator in two
overly broad ways. First, juries appear to apply the aggravator to those
defendants that avoid arrest after a murder, as opposed to defendants
whose purpose in killing was to avoid arrest. The cases show that mere
evidence that defendants took steps to avoid detection qualified them
for the aggravator. Second, juries have found the aggravator when the
murder eliminates the felony victim-witness. This is a bootstrapping
approach because all felony-murders eliminate these witnesses-the
felony murder aggravator, not the killing to avoid arrest aggravator, is
designed to deter this type of killing.
a. The Distinction Between "Purpose in Avoiding Arrest" and
Avoiding Arrest
Many of the cases in which the jury found the aggravator show
that the jury relied on evidence unrelated to the defendant's motiva-
tion in killing his victim. The jury appears to instead have focused on
the "avoid" language of the statute, which has broad connotations.
Essentially all defendants who fail to turn themselves in after the
crime can be said to have tried to avoid arrest. This approach was
78. See Menendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278, 1282 (Fla. 1979) (noting that in Florida
"an intent to avoid arrest is not present, at least when the victim is not a law enforcement
officer, unless it is clearly shown that the dominant or only motive for the murder was the
elimination of witnesses").
79. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (5) (g) (1999) ("The capital offense was committed to
disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of
laws.").
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evident in Walker v. State,80 a case where the defendant took his rape
victim to a secluded lake, drowned her, and then burned her.8' In this
case there was evidence that the victim's hands and pubic area were
burned to hamper investigation efforts.82 Fingerprints and pubic hair
were most likely to reveal the defendant's identity.83 The jury's logic
could only have been this: the defendant killed his victim by drowning
her, the defendant wanted to make it difficult for law enforcement to
find him; the defendant covered his tracks by burning the victim's
body and hiding the dress; therefore it could be inferred that the de-
fendant committed murder for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest
for rape. A finding of the aggravator based on this type of evidence is
impermissible because it disregards the "purpose" element in the ag-
gravator's statutory language. A defendant's purpose in murdering his
victim does not equate to a defendant subsequently avoiding detec-
tion after the murder.
The Walker case begs the question whether the killing to avoid
arrest aggravator applies to all rape-murders. In Holland v. State,84 the
jury found the aggravator where evidence was presented that the vic-
tim was alive after the rape, the victim's panties were stuffed down her
throat to silence her cries, and her genital area was mutilated to cause
investigators to believe that a sex fiend committed the crime-thus,
throwlng them off from suspecting the defendant.85
Again, the problem in relying on this type of evidence is that it
fails to prove the defendant's purpose in murdering his rape victim.
First, a rape victim is usually, if not always, alive after the physical act
of rape itself. The inference is that the defendant could have let his
victim go once raped. But this does not mean that the defendant's
motivation in killing the victim was to avoid arrest. If this were the
case, then all rape-murders would be subject to the aggravator. Moreo-
ver, the fact that the defendant silenced his victim by stuffing her
throat does not suggest why he killed her. Rapists, murderers, virtually
all criminals for that matter, do not want to be detected while in the
act of their underlying crimes. Focusing on measures used to achieve
one's crime can easily create misperceptions as to one's purpose in
committing the crime. Surely the Mississippi Legislature did not in-
80. 671 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1995).
81. Id. at 588-91.
82. Id. at 610.
83. Id. at 610-12.
84. 705 So. 2d 307 (Miss. 1997).
85. Id. at 355.
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tend for this aggravator to apply to all those who murder quietly or
efficiently.
The evidence relied on in Holland also suggests that juries focus
on the type of injuries suffered by the victim to find the aggravator. 86
Particularly in gruesome crimes such as rape-murder, it is difficult for
any jury to rationalize what purpose the defendant had in killing the
victims. The Florida Supreme Court aptly noted: "It is a tragic reality
that the murder of a rape victim is all too frequently the culmination
of the same hostile-aggressive impulses which triggered the initial at-
tack and not a reasoned act motivated primarily by the desire to avoid
detection."87 The defendant's actions in Holland can just as easily be
depicted as senseless acts of violence as showing that his purpose was
to avoid arrest. The jury's reading of the aggravator makes it likely
that all rape-murders will come within the broad scope of the
aggravator.
Mississippi juries also rely on a multitude of evidence after the
murder has been committed to find the aggravator. For example, in
Hughes v. State,88 the jury found the aggravator where there was evi-
dence that the victim's body was covered with debris and hidden
under the flooring of an abandoned house in a remote area and the
defendant, after the crime, cut his hair short so the police woujd not
recognize him.8 9 Likewise, in Edwards v. State,90 the jury found the ag-
gravator where there was evidence that after killing his robbery victim
and stashing the body in high weeds, the defendant removed stereo
equipment from the victim's car, took the car to a sand pit, and
burned it.91 The jury must have inferred from the burned car that the
defendant destroyed evidence linking him to the murder.
Relying on post-killing acts as evidence of the killing to avoid ar-
rest aggravator fails to narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty. Once defendants complete the act of murder, their
subsequent actions may have very little to do with their initial purpose
in killing. Haircuts and burnt evidence prove that the murderers
wanted to avoid arrest, not that their motivation in killing the victim
was to avoid arrest. The jury's reliance on evidence that could occur in
86. See id. at 355-56.
87. Doyle v. State, 460 So. 2d 353, 358 (Fla. 1984).
88. 735 So. 2d 238 (Miss. 1999).
89. Id. at 278.
90. 737 So. 2d 275 (Miss. 1999).
91. Id. at 288.
[Vol. 39
KETA TAYLOR COLBY DEATH PENALTY PROJECT
virtually any felony-murder proves that the aggravator's vague lan-
guage contributes to an unconstitutionally overbroad application.
b. Finding the Aggravator When a Felony Victim-Witness
Is Eliminated
Some jurisdictions limit their witness-protection aggravators to sit-
uations where the defendant murdered an eyewitness who was not the
victim of the underlying crime. 92 Contrarily, Mississippi case law shows
that if there is any indication that the murder victim was a witness to
the underlying offense, regardless of the fact that the witness was also
the victim of the underlying felony, then the aggravator is warranted.
In Leatherwood v. State,93 the defendants entered a taxicab, strangled
and stabbed the driver, drove the cab to a dark alley, and robbed the
victim. 94 The jury found the aggravator based on evidence that the
defendant discussed leaving no witnesses during the crime's planning
stage.95
The Leatherwood case shows that there is an inherent problem in
finding the killing to avoid arrest aggravator in premeditated robbery-
killings. Since the defendant already planned to kill the victim, there
is a tendency to infer that the defendant killed to avoid arrest. There
is, however, a more practical and plausible explanation-that the de-
fendant killed the cabdriver to effectuate the robbery. That the defen-
dant also eliminated the key witness is a collateral benefit for the
defendant. The constitutional question is whether juries are reading
the aggravator so broadly that it applies to every felony-murder.
This broad interpretation is seen in Chase v. State6" and Brown v.
State.97 In Chase, the defendants intended to rob an older couple
known to one of the defendants. 98 When the husband interrupted the
robbery, the defendants shot him.99 At trial, the jury found the ag-
gravator where there was evidence that the defendants carried gloves,
parked their get-away vehicle two hundred yards away, and blind-
92. See State v. Loyd, 459 So. 2d 498, 504 (La. 1984) (discussing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.4(h)); People v. Brownwell, 404 N.E.2d 181, 190 (Ill. 1980) (discussing ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b) (7) (1997)).
93. 435 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1983); see also Tokman v. State, 435 So. 2d 664 (Miss. 1983)
(Leatherwood's companion case).
94. Leathenvood, 435 So. 2d at 647-48.
95. See id. at 651.
96. 645 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1994).
97. 682 So. 2d 340 (Miss. 1996).
98. Chase, 645 So. 2d at 836.
99. Id. at 857.
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folded the wife so that she could not identify them.100 There was also
evidence that, on leaving the crime scene, the defendants dusted out
the tire prints.' 01 While these facts suggest that the defendants wanted
to avoid arrest, it is difficult to see how the fact that the wife was blind-
folded is relevant to finding the aggravator. After all, the wife could
still identify the other defendant who initially surprised her. Moreo-
ver, if the defendants had really wanted to avoid arrest they could have
shot the wife, leaving no witnesses to identify them. Nevertheless, con-
sidering the evidence presented, the jury must have read the killing to
avoid arrest aggravator to apply because the felony-victim was the best
witness-one who could have aided in the defendant's eventual arrest.
In Brown, the defendant, high on crack-cocaine, walked into a
convenience store, shot the clerk, and took the cash register.10 2 The
evidence suggests that the jury found the aggravator based on an in-
ference that the victim tried to defend herself or set off an alarm
before she was shot and because the defendant wore no disguise. 10 3
Like Chase, Brown was a typical robbery-murder. That the clerk could
have identified the defendant as the perpetrator does not mean that
his purpose in killing her was to avoid arrest. The defendant may have
been motivated by his need to get more crack cocaine through com-
pleting the robbery, not to avoid arrest. In Chase the aggravator is
based on the blindfolded victim, but in Brown the aggravator is based
on the defendant's lack of a disguise. These two cases show that the
vague statutory language of the aggravator may lead a jury to find it in
virtually any felony-murder.
B. The Killing to Avoid Arrest Aggravator Duplicates Other
Aggravators in Violation of Fifth Circuit Law
Because Mississippi is a weighing state, aggravators "lie at the very
heart of the jury's ultimate decision to impose a death sentence.' 0 4
The case law suggests that prosecutors often seek multiple aggravators
with the hope that the jury finds evidence of as many as possible.10 5 A
100. Id. at 856-57.
101. Id. at 857. The jury was also presented with evidence that one defendant failed to
get out of the car at a service station because he had blood on him. Id. Furthermore, both
defendants threw their bloody clothing into a kudzu patch. Id.
102. Brown, 682 So. 2d at 343.
103. Id. at 355. For facts and application similar to Brown, see Puckett v. State, 737 So. 2d
322 (Miss. 1999).
104. United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 251 (5th Cir. 1998).
105. See, e.g., Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1995) (where the prosecutor sought
five aggravators).
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particular concern for defendants in weighing states is when the fac-
tual circumstances surrounding one aggravator overlap with or dupli-
cate other aggravators. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor
essentially gets two aggravators for the price of one because the same
basis for culpability is counted twice. 10 6
The Fifth Circuit holds that counting overlapping aggravators is
inherently unfair to the defendant. 10 7 Robbery and pecuniary gain, as
well as burglary and home invasion, are examples of aggravators
found to be impermissibly duplicative because they double-count a
single act of the defendant. 10 8 While courts have not adopted a univer-
sal test for duplicate aggravators, the Fifth Circuit seems to adopt the
Tenth Circuit's approach, asking whether one aggravator "substan-
tially overlaps" or "necessarily subsumes" another aggravator. 10 9 Ag-
gravators substantially overlap if the actual conduct underlying both
aggravators is identical. 110 If it is necessary for the jury to find one
aggravator in order to find another, then one aggravator has sub-
sumed the other. I l '
The issue with the Mississippi statute is whether the killing to
avoid arrest aggravator overlaps or subsumes the felony-murder 1 2 and
the disrupt the enforcement of laws aggravators. 1 3 Unlike burglary
and home invasion, where the two aggravators could describe the
same act, killing to avoid arrest and felony-murder are distinguishable
from each other: felony-murder is an objective aggravator, while killing
to avoid arrest requires a subjective analysis. If there is evidence that the
106. Duplicate aggravators are less of a concern in non-weighing states because, again,
the jury is not instructed to weigh the total number of aggravating circumstances against
the total number of mitigating circumstances. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229-30
(1992).
107. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 250-51 (stating that "double-counting of aggravating factors
creates the risk of an arbitrary death sentence" and warrants reversal).
108. See Servin v. State, 32 P.3d 1277, 1286-87 (Nev. 2001); Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d
660, 680-81 (Miss. 1991).
109. United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1111 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Willie, 585
So. 2d at 680-81. In Willie, the Mississippi Supreme Court, holding that robbery and pecu-
niary gain overlap, found that ajury could not be allowed the opportunity to "doubly weigh
the commission of the underlying felony [(robbery)] and the motive behind the underly-
ing felony [ (pecuniary gain)] as separate aggravators." Id. However, the court articulated
no specific rule for duplicate aggravators. See id.
110. See Servin, 32 P.3d at 1287-88 (concluding that the aggravators of burglary and
home invasion are duplicative and thus invalid).
111. See McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1111.
112. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (5) (d) (1999). The most common felonies that qual-
ify for felony-murder in Mississippi are robbery, rape, burglary, kidnapping, and sexual
battery. See OCDC Study, supra note 69.
113. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (5) (g).
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defendant committed a felony during the commission of the murder,
the jury must conclude that a felony-murder has occurred and conse-
quently find the objective felony-murder aggravator. Killing to avoid
arrest, on the other hand, requires the trier-of-fact to make a subjec-
tive determination regarding the defendant's purpose in killing the
victim. For this reason, the two aggravators do not necessarily overlap
one another.
However, the killing to avoid arrest aggravator subsumes the fel-
ony-murder aggravator.114 In order to find the killing to avoid arrest
aggravator, the defendant must be avoiding arrest for an underlying
crime. In the twenty-five state cases where the jury found the killing to
avoid arrest aggravator, they also found the defendant guilty of felony-
murder in twenty-one cases; the court only reversed the jury's finding
of the killing to avoid arrest aggravator in one of these cases.115 This
114. The Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines "subsume" as "to classify within a
larger category or under a general principle." WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICIONARY
1153 (150th anniversary ed. 1981).
115. These figures are based on the author's research. The author identified twenty-
five Mississippi appellate cases that addressed the killing to avoid arrest aggravator and
determined that in these cases the jury had also found the defendant guilty of either fel-
ony-murder or capital murder of a police officer. See Wiley v. State, 750 So. 2d 1193, 1206 &
n.3 (Miss. 1999) (felony-murder robbery); Walker v. State, 740 So. 2d 873, 887, 888 (Miss.
1999) (felony-murder robbery); Manning v. State, 735 So. 2d 323, 333, 350-51 (Miss. 1999)
(felony-murder robbery); Hughes v. State, 735 So. 2d 238, 243, 278 (Miss. 1999) (felony-
murder kidnapping); West v. State, 725 So. 2d 872, 877, 884 (Miss. 1998) (felony-murder
robbery); Bell v. State, 725 So. 2d 836, 841, 857-58 (Miss. 1998) (felony-murder robbery);
Holly v. State, 716 So. 2d 979, 981, 985, 987 (Miss. 1998) (felony-murder robbery); Wood-
ward v. State, 726 So. 2d 524, 526, 540-42 (Miss. 1997) (felony murder rape); Evans v.
State, 725 So. 2d 613, 631-32, 684, 689-90 (Miss. 1997) (felony-murder kidnapping); Hol-
land v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 318-19, 355-56 (Miss. 1997) (felony-murder rape); Chase v.
State, 699 So. 2d 521, 524, 542 (Miss. 1997) (felony-murder robbery); Brown v. State, 690
So. 2d 276, 280, 284, 295-96 (Miss. 1996) (felony-murder felonious abuse and battery of a
child); Brown v. State, 682 So. 2d 340, 353-56 (Miss. 1996) (felony-murder robbery); Doss
v. State, 709 So. 2d 369, 373, 390-92 (Miss. 1996) (felony-murder robbery); Foster v. State,
687 So. 2d 1124, 1128, 1139-40 (Miss. 1996) (felony-murder robbery); Taylor v. State, 672
So. 2d 1246, 1275 (Miss. 1996) (felony-murder kidnapping where the court reversed the
jury's finding of the killing to avoid arrest and felony-murder aggravators); Walker v. State,
671 So. 2d 581, 587, 611-12, (Miss. 1995) (felony-murder sexual battery); Davis v. State,
660 So. 2d 1228, 1246-47, 1250 (Miss. 1995) (felony-murder robbery); Carr v. State, 655
So. 2d 824, 852-54 (Miss. 1995) (felony-murder robbery); Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114,
152-53 (Miss. 1991) (capital murder of a police officer); Wheeler v. State, 536 So. 2d 1341,
1342-44 (Miss. 1988) (capital murder of a police officer, where the court reversed the
jury's finding because of insufficient evidence that the defendant knew the victim was a
police officer); Lanier v. State, 533 So. 2d 473, 476, 490 (Miss. 1988) (capital murder of a
police officer); Pinkton v. State, 481 So. 2d 306, 308, 312 (Miss. 1985) (felony-murder
robbery); Leatherwood v. State, 435 So. 2d 645, 648, 650-51 (Miss. 1983) (felony-murder
robbery); Johnson v. State, 416 So. 2d 383, 387, 393 (Miss. 1982) (capital murder of a
police officer).
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data indicates there is an eighty-eight percent chance that where a
jury finds the defendant guilty of felony-murder, it will also find the
killing to avoid arrest aggravator. 116 The defendant therefore enters
the sentencing phase with two aggravators simply based on the exis-
tence of an underlying felony. This, in turn, tips the scale in favor of
death for a weighing jury. Because those sentenced to death have
committed an underlying felony in roughly seventy-five percent of all
capital cases,1 17 there is an immense risk that a jury will find both
aggravators in an impermissibly broad number of circumstances.
Further proof that the two aggravators are duplicative is seen in
the intent of the killing to avoid arrest statute. The Fifth Circuit noted
that this aggravator "merely achieves the state's interest in protecting
victims of felonies from being killed to prevent the felon's detec-
tion."118 Similarly, felony-murder aims to protect victims of felonies
from being killed during the commission of a felony.1 19 A weighing
jury, without a limiting instruction from the judge, is simply not capa-
ble of determining that one aggravator could apply and not the other.
A similar problem with duplication of aggravators arises with the
disrupt the enforcement of laws aggravator. Out of the twenty-five
cases where the killing to avoid arrest aggravator was at issue, four of
these cases did not involve felony-murder, but instead involved the
killing of a police officer.' 20 In one of these cases, the court affirmed
the jury's finding of the disrupt the enforcement of laws aggravator.12 1
Whenever an officer is killed while trying to arrest a felon, the jury can
find both aggravators: the defendant killed to avoid a lawful arrest and
to disrupt the enforcement of laws. Like burglary and home invasion,
the two aggravators overlap.
116. Since the court did not dispute the jury's finding of the killing to avoid arrest
aggravator in twenty-four of the twenty-five cases where it was addressed and the defendant
was convicted of felony-murder in twenty-one of these cases, felony-murder and the killing
to avoid arrest aggravator overlap approximately eighty-eight percent of the time.
117. Percentage based on data from the OCDC. See OCDC Study, supra note 69.
118. Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1110 (5th Cir. 1982) (where the defendant was sen-
tenced to death in Mississippi state court, but the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sentence, par-
ticularly the breadth of the killing to avoid arrest aggravator, in habeas corpus).
119. See State v. Johnson, 699 A.2d 57, 67 (Conn. 1997) (McDonald, AJ., concurring
and dissenting).
120. See Lanier, 533 So. 2d 473;Johnson, 416 So. 2d 383; Hansen, 592 So. 2d 114; Wheeler,
536 So. 2d 1341.
121. Lanier, 533 So. 2d at 490. In Wheeler, the court reversed the jury's finding of the
disrupt the enforcement of laws aggravator because the defendant did not know the victim
was an officer. Wheeler, 536 So. 2d at 1342-44. The court gave no reason why this aggravator
was absent in two other cases. See Johnson, 416 So. 2d at 393; Hansen, 592 So. 2d at 152-53.
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Since felony-murder and the murder of law enforcement officers
are the two most common types of capital murder,122 an overwhelm-
ing number of capital murderers face the prospect of beginning their
sentencing phase with two aggravators. 123 The killing to avoid arrest
aggravator is superfluous in a weighing state like Mississippi because
in nearly all situations where it applies ei'ther the felony-murder or the
disrupt the enforcement of laws aggravator will be found on the same
facts. This scenario contributes to the arbitrary sentencing of defend-
ants in violation of Fifth Circuit law, 124 as well as Furman-a defendant
with both aggravators is no more deserving of death than a defendant
with only one aggravator.
M. The Narrowing of Killing to Avoid Arrest: Other State
Approaches
Recognizing that the killing to avoid arrest aggravator applies to
an impermissibly broad number of defendants, other state supreme
courts have limited its scope. In cases where juries might focus on a
defendant's action after the murder, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that "a post-killing expression evidencing an after-the-fact
desire not to be detected or apprehended" does not imply that the
defendant killed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest. 125 Moreo-
ver, it found that "'[i] n a broad sense every murder silences the vic-
tim, thus having the effect of aiding the criminal in the avoidance or
protection of his arrest."' 1 26 To find the aggravator in North Carolina,
evidence must show that "at least one of the purposes motivating the
killing was defendant's desire to avoid subsequent detection."'127 The
court's focus on "purpose" attempts to narrow the class of defendants
subject to the aggravator because proof of the requisite intent to avoid
arrest must be very strong.
122. See OCDC Study, supra note 69.
123. See id. (providing that 157 of 191 death sentences involved at least one of these
types of capital murder).
124. See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 250-51 (5th Cir. 1998).
125. State v. Williams, 284 S.E.2d 437, 456 (N.C. 1981) (where the court reversed the
jury's finding of the aggravator, which was based on evidence that the defendant wanted to
leave the crime scene at a slow rate of speed so as not to attract attention). North Caro-
lina's aggravator shares the precise language of the Mississippi statute. Compare N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(4) (2003) ("The capital felony was committed for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.") with Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (e) (1999).
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Florida, another state where the death penalty is frequently im-
posed, similarly finds that "an intent to avoid arrest is not present, at
least when the victim is not a law enforcement officer, unless it is
clearly shown that the dominant or only motive for the murder was
the elimination of witnesses." 128 This finding directs Florida courts to
focus on motive, much like the North Carolina courts focus on pur-
pose. Both states' interpretations of the aggravator imply that Missis-
sippi's broad approach is unconstitutional.
Louisiana, which does not have a killing to avoid arrest ag-
gravator, has another aggravator that deals with defendants who elimi-
nate witnesses. It states that an aggravating circumstance shall be
found where "[t] he victim was... an eye witness to a crime alleged to
have been committed by the defendant or possessed other material
evidence against the defendant."' 29 The state court addressed the
problem of a broad application and held that it applies only where the
victim of the murder was an eyewitness to an earlier independent crime
allegedly committed by the accused. 130 Here, the aggravator would
not apply in the rape-murder or robbery-murder context.
Other jurisdictions have also acknowledged duplicate aggravator
concerns. The Alabama Supreme Court argued: "One interpretation
of this provision would enable it to be applied in all felony cases in
which death has ensued, for it could be said that one of the purposes
of inflicting any death would be to prevent identification by the vic-
tim."' 13 The court, however, believed that "the legislature .. .placed
special emphasis upon the protection of persons effecting lawful ar-
rests . . .and thus sought to deter such conduct by applying the ex-
treme sanction to it."132 This reading limits application to those in law
enforcement that effectuate lawful arrests.1 33
128. Menendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278, 1282 (Fla. 1979) (interpreting FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141(5)(e) (2004), which mirrors the precise language of Mississippi's
aggravator).
129. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(8) (West 2004).
130. See State v. Loyd, 459 So. 2d 498, 504 (La. 1984).
131. Ex parteJohnson, 399 So. 2d 873, 874 (Ala. 1979).
132. Id. at 874. Alabama's killing to avoid arrest aggravator also shares the precise lan-
guage as Mississippi's aggravator. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(5) (Supp. 2003) ("The capital
offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effect-
ing an escape from custody.").
133. Alabama's criminal code, like Mississippi's, states that an aggravating circum-
stance may be found where a "capital offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the
lawful exercise of ... the enforcement of laws," yet it still applies the killing to avoid arrest
aggravator narrowly. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(7) (Supp. 2003).
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North Carolina has also held that the aggravators of killing to
avoid arrest and disrupt the enforcement of laws are unconstitution-
ally duplicative.1 34 If Mississippi were to adopt any of these ap-
proaches, the aggravator would perhaps be sufficiently narrow to
comport with Furman. As the next section examines, however, this has
simply not been the case.
IV. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Own Construction of
the Aggravator Fails to Cure the Statute's Facial
Vagueness and Allows for an Overbroad
Application
A. Curing Unconstitutional Aggravators
Although the killing to avoid arrest aggravator remains facially
vague and overbroad, states like North Carolina, Florida, and Ala-
bama are able to limit the scope of the aggravator via their appellate
courts. The Supreme Court implied in cases after Furman and Gregg
that a facially infirm aggravator may be cured by either a trial judge
supplying the jury with a limiting definition of the aggravator 135 or by
the appellate court applying its own narrowing construction. 136 The
Court has suggested that consistent adherence to a narrowing con-
struction on appellate review can make a facially vague aggravator
constitutional. 137 For example, in Godfrey the Court stated that the
Georgia Supreme Court could have cured the constitutional defect in
its aggravator that the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, hor-
rible or inhuman" by limiting the aggravator to cases where there was
evidence of "'torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to
the victim.' ,,138 Under this construction, the basic approach is to de-
fine vague terms with more objective factors.
Because neither the Supreme Court nor state supreme courts
have ever explicitly held that the killing to avoid arrest aggravator is
facially unconstitutional, there is no legal mandate for appellate and
trial judges to limit the scope of the aggravator. Arguably, Mississippi's
neighboring jurisdictions narrow their application of the aggravator
134. State v. Goodman, 257 S.E.2d 569, 587 (N.C. 1979).
135. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990).
136. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360 (1988) (affirming the Tenth Circuit's
conclusion that the state appellate court's failure to limit the aggravating circumstance
when affirming the death sentence rendered it unconstitutionally vague).
137. See id. at 363 (noting the constitutional requirement of channeling and limiting
discretion in imposing death penalty to avoid capricious and arbitrary action).
138. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 431-32 (1980).
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on appellate review because they recognize its frailties and want to
prevent an overbroad application. Mississippi does not share this
concern.
B. Mississippi's Construction of the Aggravator Is Illusory
When Mississippi defendants have argued that its courts should
adopt narrower approaches to the aggravator the Mississippi Supreme
Court has replied that these approaches are "too restrictive." 39 More-
over, the court has held that a limiting instruction for the jury is "un-
necessary." 140 Instead, the court reviews the aggravator under the
following court-created construction:
If there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a
substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the
killer or killers or to "cover their tracks" so as to avoid apprehen-
sion and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the
court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating
circumstance. 141
The court, noting that each case must be decided on its own "pe-
culiar fact situation," implicitly wants to give judges some objective
guidelines when reviewing a mainly subjective aggravator. 142 Jurors,
however, never hear this construction, and the Mississippi Supreme
Court assumes that trial judges are aware of the construction during
the sentencing phase and will not allow the jury to consider the ag-
gravator if there is insufficient evidence. 143 It appears then that the
construction serves two purposes. First, it is an evidentiary threshold
for sentencing judges, and second, it is a standard for the Mississippi
Supreme Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence.'"
On its face, the construction seems to limit the reviewing court's
application of the aggravator-it gives judges evidence to look for and
it requires that a defendant's purpose be "substantial." In practice, the
construction does just the opposite-it actually broadens the applica-
tion of the aggravator.
139. Leatherwood v. State, 435 So. 2d 645, 651 (Miss. 1983) (criticizing Florida's ap-
proach to the aggravator).
140. Brown v. State, 682 So. 2d 340, 355 (Miss. 1996).
141. Leatherwood, 435 So. 2d at 651.
142. See id.
143. See id. It is assumed the jury only hears the aggravating factor as it is written in the
statutory text. See Mississippi JuRy INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, supra note 51, § 1:24(11); Wal-
ton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (noting that "trial judges are presumed to know
the law and to apply it in making their decisions").
144. It is unclear whether sentencing judges actually rely on this narrowing construc-
tion when deciding whether jurors should be instructed on the aggravator.
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The court reviews whether a substantial reason for the killing was
to "conceal [the defendant's] identity" or to "cover [his] tracks" so as
to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by the authorities. 45 This
inquiry adds an extra and unwarranted element into the analysis. One
who kills to avoid a lawful arrest is different from one who kills to
conceal his identity, which in turn may lead to avoiding apprehension.
The appellate court, reviewing a jury's finding of the aggravator,
could reasonably infer that all felons murdered their robbery or rape
victims to conceal their identity. 46
Even if this construction purports to guide a trial judge, the re-
viewing court has failed to adhere to this construction and has instead
consistently sustained the jury's finding of the aggravator. 147 The
court has focused on evidence showing that a defendant concealed his
identity during and after the murder. The court has also held that
jurors may make the "logical connection" between the injuries suf-
fered and the inference that the defendant murdered his victim to
avoid arrest. 148 Recall the cases above where juries found the ag-
gravator based on evidence that the victim's throat was stuffed to si-
lence her cries, 149 that the defendant hid the victim's body,15 0 and
that the defendant initially did not confess to the crime.' 5 ' This evi-
dence does not show that the defendant's purpose in killing was to con-
ceal his identity or cover his tracks-it only shows that he concealed
his identity or covered his tracks.
Another fault with this construction is that the court interprets
the term "lawful arrest," which suggests that law enforcement is at-
tempting to apprehend the suspect, to mean "eventual arrest."'152 The
problem with "eventual arrest" is that all criminals may eventually be
arrested, and in fact this will be true in all cases in which a defendant
is standing trial. 15 This allows courts to affirm the jury's focus on post-
killing acts, like haircuts, that may be completely unrelated to the de-
fendant's initial purpose in murdering the victim.
145. Leatherwood, 435 So. 2d at 651.
146. Recall that the Mississippi Supreme Court automatically reviews all death
sentences. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(4) (1999).
147. The Mississippi Supreme Court has only reversed a jury finding of the aggravator
in one of the twenty-five cases surveyed by the author. See supra note 115.
148. Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 355 (Miss. 1997).
149. See id.
150. See Hughes v. State, 735 So. 2d 238, 278 (Miss. 1999).
151. See Woodward v. State, 726 So. 2d 524, 541 (Miss. 1997).
152. See, e.g., Leathenood, 435 So. 2d at 651.
153. See People v. Bigelow, 691 P.2d 994, 1006-07 (Cal. 1984) (holding that the special
circumstance of avoiding arrest should be limited to cases in which the arrest is imminent).
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The final concern with the court's construction is its use of the
term "substantial" when referring to a defendant's reason for killing.
The statute and the jury instruction refer only to the defendant's "pur-
pose," not to a "substantial purpose."'1 5 4 The inclusion of the term sub-
stantial could mean that the court recognizes both the subjectivity of
the aggravator and the statute's facial overbreadth, because any juror
could reasonably conceive that at least one of the defendant's pur-
poses was to avoid arrest. Including the term substantial allows the
trial judge and appellate court to distinguish those defendants who
killed for numerous reasons from those who killed specifically to avoid
a lawful arrest. However, when the term is not included in the jury
instructions the same cannot be said to be true with respect to the
jury's analysis of the aggravator.
Moreover, because the court is unwilling to concede the statute's
overbreadth and simply affirms the jury's finding of the aggravator,
even when unwarranted, inclusion of the term "substantial" serves no
purpose. The fact that the court has only once in twenty-five cases
reversed a finding of the killing to avoid arrest aggravator evidences
this superficial interpretation of the term substantial. The reviewing
court deemphasizes the subjective element of the aggravator, which
explicitly refers to the defendant's purpose in killing the victim, as
much as an uninstructed jury does. While a cursory reading of the
court's construction appears to follow other jurisdictions' limiting ap-
proaches to the aggravator, case law shows that the Mississippi Su-
preme Court affirms the aggravator's overbroad application. The
court's consistent affirmation violates both the principles derived
from Furman and the Fifth Circuit prohibition of the use of duplicate
aggravators.
Conclusion
In addition to narrowing the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty, aggravators exist to 'Justify the imposition of a more
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty tf
murder."155 Mississippi's felony-murder, killing to avoid arrest, and
disrupt the enforcement of laws aggravators justify a more severe sen-
tence for those who kill in the course of committing a felony, those
who kill to avoid arrest and to eliminate witnesses, and those who kill
154. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5) (e) (1999); MISSISSIPPI JuRY, INSTRUCTIONS- CRIMI-
NAL, supra note 51, § 1:24(II)(e).
155. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
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law enforcement, respectively. Through these aggravators, the State
aims to protect these particular victims. The challenge is to continue
to protect these classes of victims without the constitutionally infirm
killing to avoid arrest aggravator.
Mississippi can only comport with the mandates of Furman and its
progeny by eliminating the killing to avoid arrest aggravator. The ag-
gravator's statutory language is too vague, and the Mississippi Su-
preme Court continues to muddle the aggravator's application to
each case. The court's treatment of the aggravator is so misguided it
cannot be remedied with a limiting or narrowing construction. Even if
the court were to require that a defendant's purpose be "substantial,"
this would not take the subjectivity out of the aggravator. Would sub-
stantial mean that the defendant's purpose in killing to avoid arrest
represents more than fifty percent of his entire purpose? Any specula-
tion by the jury would result in arbitrary and overbroad findings.
In the aggravator's absence, felony-murder and the disrupted the
enforcement of laws aggravators will continue to protect felony victims
and law enforcement. To continue to protect witnesses, Mississippi
should adopt Louisiana's witness-protection aggravator, which re-
quires that "[t] he victim was .. .an eye witness to a crime alleged to
have been committed by the defendant or possessed other material
evidence against the defendant."156 Like its sister state, Mississippi
would have to preclude its application in cases where the victim of the
murder cannot be shown to have been an eye witness to an earlier
independent crime allegedly committed by the accused.1 57 This
should be achieved by a limiting instruction to the jury.
Until Mississippi eliminates the killing to avoid arrest aggravator,
defendants, especially those guilty of felony-murder, will continue to
be sentenced to death in an overly broad manner-a manner that the
United States Supreme Court explicitly condemned in Zant.'58 The
injustice in Mississippi's use of the killing to avoid arrest aggravator
make it-and any death sentences that rely upon it-
unconstitutional.
156. LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.4(8) (1997).
157. See State v. Loyd, 459 So. 2d 498, 504 (La. 1984).
158. Zant, 462 U.S. at 876-77.
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